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In Tamlin v. Hannaford' Denning LJ, as he then was, said:
"It is, of course, a settled rule that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless
there can be gathered from it an intention that the Crown should be bound."
As Master of the Rolls he again referred to the rule when considering whether
the Crown needed to obtain planning permission to change the use of certain land:
"Looking at the whole of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, I am
satisfied that the Crown does not need to get planning permission in respect
of its own interest in Crown lands. The reason why it is exempt is, not by
virtue of any provision in the Act itself, but by reason of the general principle
that the Crown is not bound by an Act unless it is expressly or impliedly
included. "2
The existence of the rule may well be settled but its scope remains open to
argument, as evidenced by the recent decision of the House of Lords on appeal
from Scotland: Lord Advocate v. DumbartonD. c..3Nor is it always clear whether a
particular body is entitled to claim to be part of "the Crown" for the purpose of
immunity from legislation or in order to be able to claim the benefit of statutory
provisions such as section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947: British Medical
Association v. Greater Glasgow Health Board.4
Formulations of a rule reflecting the privileged position of the Crown date back
to the mid-fifteenth century.5 In Willion v. Berkley,6 a case where the Crown was
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5. See H. Street, Governmental Liability (1953), pp.143-144. In Lord Advocate v. Dumbarton D.C.
[1989] 3 W. L. R. 1346, 1351 Lord Keith of Kinkel cites the formulation Roy n 'est lie per ascrln scawte, si
il ne soit expressement nosme (Jenk. Cent. 307) which is adopted in Broom, Legal Maxims, p. 38. Jenkins, a
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old age and confinement in prison": J.W. Wallace, The Reporters 4th ed. (1882), p.70.
6. Willian v. Berkley (1561) Plowden 223.
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held to be bound by the statute De Donis Conditionalibus, counsel on the losing side
explained the rule on the ground that the King, when assenting to an Act, does not
intend to prejudice himself or to bar himself of his liberty and privilege but he
assents that it shall be a law among his subjects. That, as Wronesley J observed in
A ttorney General v. Hancock,? "would, perhaps, nowadays be regarded as rather an
overstatement of the position of the Crown with regard to Acts of Parliament." It
was not necessarily so obviously an over statement at a time when the Crown was
not in any event liable to be sued in its own courts8 and the range oflegislation was
far more restricted than in the last hundred years. In more modern terminology
the rule can best be described as reflecting a presumed intention of Parliament or
as "only an instance of a mere [sic]general rule. The doctrine that the words of an
instrument shall be taken most strictly against the party employing them does not apply
to the Crown. Such a grant is construed most strictly against the grantee and most
beneficially for the Crown ... "9 Thus the rule should be regarded as one of
construction rather than a prerogative of the Crown,1O a view endorsed by the
House of Lords in Lord Advocate v. Dumbarton D. C. 11In the following pages it is
intended to discuss whether the rule or presumption applies to all statutes; the
meaning forthe purpose of the rule of "Crown"; the right of the Crown to take the
benefit of an Act of Parliament although not named therein 12 and finally to criticise
the current position.
1. Statutes within the rule of construction
Dicta in old cases and statements in writers such as Blackstone and Chitty
suggested that the rule of construction in favour of the Crown applied to statutes
which would divest or abridge the king of "his rights or interests"13 or "his
prerogatives, his interests or his remedies. "14 In a further category of statutes there
was a presumption that the king was bound even by implication, namely statutes
"expressly made for the preservation of public rights and the suppression of public
7. [1940)1 K.B. 427,431.
8. See O. Hood Phillips, Consticutional and Administralive Law 7th ed. (1987), p.702.
9. H.V. Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (1987), pA2. For a discussion of the privileged position of the
Crown in relation to deeds, see Lonsdale (Earl of) v. Allorney-Genera/ [1981] I W.L.R. 887. The
reversal of the normal presumption was referred to - but in the absence of an ambiguity its applicability
did not have to be decided - at first instance in Inglewood Investment v. Forestry Commission [1988)1
W.L.R. 959; affirmed [1988] I W.L.R. 1278.
10.P.W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown (1971), pp.166-167. The Crown Proceedings Act 1947,s.40(2)(f)
cautiously refers to "any rules of evidence or any presumption relating to the extent to which the
Crown is bound by any Act of Parliament."
11. [I 989J3W.L.R. 1346, 1360per Lord Keith of Kinkel, approving a dictum of Diplock LJ in British
Broadcasting Corporation v.Johns [1965)Ch. 32, 78-79, and explaining dicta inMadras Electric Supply
Corporation Ltd. v. Boarland [1955) A.C. 667. See Roberts v. Ahern (1904) I c.L.R. 406, 417 per
Griffith CJ; Minister for Works (W.A.) v. Gu/son (1944) 69 c.L.R. 338, 347 per Latham CJ;
Commonwealth v. Bogle (1953) 89 c.L.R. 229,259 per Fullager J: "[A) pure question of construction."
12. Blackstone, Comm., i,262; Craies on Statute Law 7th ed. (1971), pA38.
13. Blackstone, lac. cit.
14. Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown (1820), p.383.
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wrongs [provided that they did] not interfere with the established rights of the
Crown."15 Chitty states that to the' general rule
"there is a most important exception, namely, that the King is impliedly
bound by statutes passed for the public good; the relief of the poor; the
general advancement of learning, religion and justice; or to prevent fraud,
injury or wrong ... And the Crown, though not named, is bound by the
general words of statutes which tend to perform the will of a founder or
donor."16
The scope of the rule favouring the Crown in modern law fell to be considered
by the House of Lords in Lord Advocate v. Dumbarton D.C.17 since, although an
appeal from Scotland, their Lordships held that the law of Scotland on the
question must agree with the law of England - which had therefore to be
determined in the light of the modern cases. The Ministry of Defence had decided
to erect an improved security fence around the submarine base at Faslane,
Dumbartonshire. The execution of the work - which was undertaken by a firm of
contractors, Tarmac Construction Ltd. - involved erecting various temporary
buildings on part of a road adjoining the base. Strathclyde Regional Council
claimed that as roads authority for the area it was entitled under the Roads
(Scotland) Act 1984 to call for the removal of the various structures connected
with the fencing work. The Dumbarton District Council, as local planning
authority, served on the Property Services Agency, through which the Ministry of
Defence was acting, an enforcement notice under section 84 of the Town and
Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 requiring the restoration of the road to its
former unrestricted use as a public highway. The Ministry of Defence claimed
that neither statute bound the Crown and the Lord Advocate sought declarators to
that effect in the Court of Session. At first instance Lord Cullen found for the
Crown. The First Division, however, held that the relevant legislation did bind the
Crown. From that decision the Lord Advocate appealed to the House of Lords.
(By the time the appeal was heard the construction work had been completed so
that, as Lord Keith pointed out,18the question in a sense had become academic.
Nonetheless it was appropriate that the House should decide the issue because of
its general importance and the matter of costs remained a live one.)19
In allowing the Crown's appeal Lord Keith recognised that prior to the union of
1707 Scots law knew no presumption that the Crown was not bound by an Act of
15. Blackstone, supra n. 12.
16. Ibid., citing the Magdalen College Case (16]5) ] 1 Co.Rep.66b. See too Craies, p.439 ec seq.; Broom,
Legal Maxims, pp.39-40.
17. [1989] 3 W.L.R. 1346.
18. [1989] 3 W.L.R. 1346, 1351.
19. Simi]arly Bn'cish Medical Associacion v. Greacer Glasgow Healch Board []989] A.C. 121]. For an even
more striking example of the role of costs in giving jurisdiction to appellate courts, see Mahon v. Air
New Zealand [1984] A.C. 808.
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Parliament.2o He traced the adoption of the English doctrine through the Court of
Exchequer in a series of cases dealing with taxation - and then referred to two cases
dealing with the powers oflocal authorities to regulate building operations. In the
second of these cases the Lord President Dunedin said:
"While I do not doubt that there are certain provisions by which the Crown
never would be bound unless that were clearly expressed - such, for
instance, as the provisions of a taxing statute, or certain enactments with
penal clauses adjected, as, for example, certain provisions of the Motor Car
Act, and so on - yet, when you corne to a set of provisions in a statute having
for its object the benefit of the public generally, there is not an antecedent
unlikelihood that the Crown will consent to be bound, and this, I think,
would be so in the case of regulations which are meant to apply to all the land
in a city, and where the Crown's property is not property held jure coronae,
but has been acquired from a subject-superior for the use of one of the public
departments. "21
There was, Lord Keith continued, no rational ground on which a different
approach to the construction of a statute for the purpose of ascertaining whether it
bound the Crown should be adopted in Scotland and England. Therefore it was
appropriate to consider the modern English cases.
"The law has developed to a point where it is not helpful to refer to writings
of greater or less antiquity which discuss the prerogatives of the Crown. "22
Lord Keith examined the English cases since Gorton Local Board v. Prison
Commissioners23 and concluded that they established that the Crown is not bound
by a statute unless by express words or necessary implication.24 Nor will the
Courts easily find that a statute applies to the Crown by implication. In Province of
Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay25 Lord Du Parcq,
delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, suggested that a necessary implication
that the Crown was to be bound would arise only where it is apparent from the
terms of a statute that its beneficent purpose would otherwise be wholly
20. See further J.D.B. Mitchell, "The Royal Prerogative in Modem Scots Law", [1957] P.L. 304;
}.D.B. Mitchell, Constillltianal Law 2nd ed. (1968), p.183.
21. Magistraces of Edinburgh v. Lord Advocate 1912 S.C. 1985, 1090-1, citing with approval a similar
dictum of Lord Kyllachy in Somerville v. Lord Advocace (1893) 20 R.1050, 1064-5.
22. (1989] 3 W.L.R. 1346, 1354.
23.[1904] 2 K.B. 164, 165n. (Gorton had been decided in 1887 but reported as a note to Cooper v.
Hawkins).
24. Hornsey V.D.C. v. Hennell (1902] 2 K.B. 73, 80 per Lord Alverstone CJ; Actorney-General v.
Hancock [194011 K.B. 427, 439 per Wrottesley J; Accorney-General v. Randall [1944] I K.B. 709,712
per Morton J;Miniscry of Agricullllre, Fisheries and Foodv.Jenkins (1963] 2Q.B. 317, 325 per Denning
LJ; Bricish Broadcascing Corporacian v.Johns [1965] Ch. 32, 78-79 per Diplock LJ.
25. (1947] A.C. 58.
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frustrated. Nor would an express saving clause exempting the Crown from
particular provisions of an Act be sufficient to rebut the application of the normal
rule of construction to other sections of the Act. Such saving provisions were to be
regarded as being inserted ex abundanti cautela.26 Lord Du Parcq also indicated
that he did not regard the dictum of Lord President Dunedin27 as representing
English law on Crown immunity.
Counsel for the local authorities attempted to limit the scope of the rule of
construction by arguing that it only applied to cases where the Crown's lawful
freedom of action would be constrained. Thus if it were accepted that the Crown
had no right to erect structures on a highway any legislation relating to
obstructions on highways should be interpreted in its application to the Crown
without resort to any presumption of non-application. Lord Keith emphasised the
practical difficulties of such an approach. The Crown in some circumstances
might be entitled, like any private owner of premises, to obstruct the highway. 28 It
would be absurd to suggest that in such circumstances a statute did not bind the
Crown but when the Crown was acting without any right the statute did bind:
"It is preferable, in my view, to stick to the simple rule that the Crown is not
bound by any statutory provision unless there can somehow be gathered
from the terms of the relevant Act an intention to that effect. The Crown can
be bound only by express words or necessary implication. The modern
authorities do not, in my opinion, require that any gloss should be placed
upon that formulation of the principle. However, as the very nature of these
appeals demonstrates, it is most desirable that Acts of Parliament should
always state explicitly whether or not the Crown is intended to be bound by
any, and if so what, of their provisions. "29
Lord Keith then considered the provisions of the relevant legislation and
concluded that neither Act bound the Crown expressly or by necessary
implication.
Of the alleged exceptions to the general presumption in favour of the Crown
which depend on the authority of Coke's report of theMagdalen College Case30 that
of statutes passed for the public good has been examined in a number of modern
cases and found wanting. In Territorial Auxiliary Forces Association of the County
of London v. Nichols31 the Court of Appeal held that the Rent Acts did not bind the
Crown. Scott LJ said, in reference to the argument that statutes passed for the
26. [1947] A.C. 58,65. See also Homsey V.D.C. v. Hennell [1902] 2 K.B. 73,80, per Lord Alverstone
CJ·
27. Supra n.21.
28. The Crown did not in these proceedings rely on any prerogative right for the defence of the realm:
[1989] 2 W.L.R. 1346, 1362.
29. [1989] 3 W.L.R. 1346,1366.
30. (1615) II Co.Rep.66b; supra p.47; Craies, supra n.12, pp.439-444.
31. [1949] 1 K.B. 35.
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public good were to bind the Crown:
"Possibly the words had a meaning narrower than would attach to them
today. It is difficult to suppose at the present day that any public statute is
not in theory at least directed to the welfare of the public ... If the ancient
rule ever had in fact the wide meaning claimed for it we can only conclude
that it has been 'eaten away' by exceptions."32
Similarly in Province of Bombay v.Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay33
Lord Du Parcq expressed the view that the contention that statutes passed for the
public good impliedly bind the Crown "cannot now be regarded as sound except
in a strictly limited sense". 34In that case the Privy Council held that the Crown
could refuse to allow the city authority to lay drains through Crown property
despite a provision in the City of Bombay Municipal Act 1882 which gave the
authority power to lay drains through or under "any street ... and into through or
under any land whatsoever within the city." In Department of Transport v.
Egorofp5 the Court of Appeal refused to hold that the Housing Act 1961, sections
32 and 33, which implied certain obligations into leases, applied to leases granted
by the Crown. Counsel conceded that the Act did not apply to the Crown expressly
or by necessary implication. He argued, however, that it fell within the Magdalen
College Case as a statute made to suppress a wrong. In rejecting that argument
Parker LJ said that the classification of statutes in the Magdalen College Case was
too wide to be of general assistance and had been wholly disposed of as a reliable
guide by the Province of Bombay case.
Coke's dicta in the Magdalen College Case have been relied on in a number of old
cases in which the Crown has been held to be bound by statute36 but it is difficult to
believe that at the present time the fact that a statute fell within one of the
categories he enumerated would be more than an element to be considered in
construing the true meaning of the Act.
2. The meaning of "the Crown"
Once it had been held that a statute does not bind the Crown, "This question
then becomes important - who and what are covered by the shield of the
Crown?"37 The meaning of the term "the Crown" may arise in various contexts,
32. At p.45.
33. [1947] A.C. 58.
34. At pp.62-63; cited, Lord Advocare v. Dumbarron D.C. [1989] 3 W.L.R. 1346, 1356.
35. The Times, 5 May, 1986; [1986] 1 E.G.L.R. 89; [1986] 18H.L.R. 326.
36. Craies, supra n.12, pp.439-444. Craies comments on these cases (at p.443): "They are scarcely
sufficient in number or variety to justify the very general adoption of the propositions propounded by
Coke in the Magdalen College Case with regard to the kind of statutes by which the Crown is bound
without being named."
37. W. Harrison Moore, "Liability for Acts of Public Servants", (1907) 23 L. Q.R. 12, 16.
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whether immunity from statutory provisions, immunity from judicial proceed-
ings,38the application of provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947,39or in
situations where the divisibility of the Crown is an issue40(which in federations
such as Australia may well be involved in disputes over the scope of "Crown"
immunity from legislation).41
At one extreme there can be little doubt that "the Crown" in the context of
immunity from a statute includes the ministers of the Crown, the departments of
state and the civil servants employed in those departments.42 In Gorton Local
Board v. Prison Commissioners43 the Divisional Court, having held that the Public
Health Acts did not bind the Crown, concluded without further ado that they did
not apply to land on which the Prison Commissioners wished to erect houses for
prison warders. The land in the words of Day J was "state property ... provided
by the Crown for the purposes of the Crown ... occupied by servants of the
Crown." Similarly the right of a local authority under the Public Health Act 1875,
section 150, to recover from adjoining landowners the cost of paving a street was
not enforceable against the Commanding Officer of premises used for the
purposes of the 1st Volunteer Battalion (Duke of Cambridge's Own) Middlesex
Regiment: Homsey V.D.C. v. Hennell.44 In Attorney-General v. Hancock45
Wrottesley J held that the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1939which forbade
the bringing of actions to enforce judgments without the leave of the Court did not
bind the Crown. The action in question related to a debt due to the Crown (arrears
of income tax) and hence clearly, if the Act did not bind the Crown, could be
brought without leave. Similarly inAttorney-General v.Randall,46 once the Court
of Appeal had held that the Debtors Act 1869did not bind the Crown, there could
be no doubt that H.M. Customs and Excise could claim the advantage of that
immunity to arrest the debtor, contrary to the terms of the Act. Again in Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food v. Jenkins47 the validity of a notice given to a
tenant under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 depended on whether the
landlord required the land for non-agricultural use for which planning permission
was not required. The Court of Appeal held that the relevant planning legislation
(the Town and Country Planning Act 1947)did not bind the Crown. The landlord
as Minister of the Crown clearly fell within that Crown immunity. The shield
covers not merely ministers and departments but any servant of the Crown: for
38. Mel/enger v. New Brunswick Developmenc Corporation [1971] I W.L.R. 604.
39. British Medical Association v. Greater Glasgow Health Board [1989] A.C. 1211.
40. R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Indian Association of Alberta
[1982] Q.B. 892.
41. E.g., Minister for Works (W.A.) v. Gulson (1944) 69 C.L.R. 338; Commonwealth of Australia v. Bogle
(1953) 89 c.L.R. 229; P.W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown (1971) 188 et seq.
42. Cf Town Investments v. Departmenc of the Environmenc [1978] A.C. 359.
43. [1904] 2 K.B. 1650.
44. [1902] 2 K.B. 73.
45. [1940] I K.B. 427.
46. [1944] I K.B. 709.
47. (1963] 2 Q.B. 317.
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example a civilian driver employed by the Secretary of State for War was not liable
to prosecution for exceeding the speed limit once it had been established that the
statute did not bind the Crown: Cooper v. Hawkins.48
Difficult questions may, however, arise, for example, where duties are
undertaken by independent or semi-independent bodies, whether incorporated or
not, or by independent contractors. While each case must be decided on its facts
some general principles can be drawn from the cases. First, in determining
whether a person or body is "covered by the shield of the Crown" great weight is to
be attached to the degree of control which the Crown through its ministers can
exercise over the performance of the relevant duties.49 Secondly, immunity is
likely to extend to those in consimili casu with Crown servants, discharging duties
of a public nature connected with the Crown, for example the administration of
justice. 50 The dividing line between servants of the Crown and those in consimili
casu may be fine and it is of no matter whether, for example, a volunteer regiment
and its officers are exempt from a Public Health Act because they are Crown
servants or in consimili casu therewith. Thirdly, as Denning LJ pointed out in
Tamlin v .Hannaford, 51 bodies carrying out commercial activities are unlikely to be
regarded as part of the Crown: thus the Rent Acts were held in Tamlin to bind the
British Transport Commission although they had earlier been held not to bind the
Territorial Forces Association.52 While, however, it may be relatively easy to
distinguish commercial activities from those traditionally undertaken by the state,
there is room for argument about the status of public bodies undertaking activities
which formerly did not fall within the sphere of the Crown Service, for example in
the field of broadcasting or health. In British Broadcasting Corporation v. Johns53
the Court of Appeal recognised that the scope of Crown services and activities
could vary from time to time. There was no inherent reason why broadcasting
should not be a Crown activity and broadcasting bodies part of the Crown. But the
B.B.C. had been so clearly and deliberately created as an independent body that it
could not claim the benefit of Crown immunity from taxing statutes. The Court
contrasted broadcasting with the provision of health services where the legislative
framework and degree of ministerial control made it appropriate to regard the
activities of the National Health Service as a service of the Crown: Pfizer
Corporation v. Ministry of Health. 54 It does not, however, necessarily follow that a
body providing Crown services or occupying land for Crown services is part of the
Crown55 so that it can claim immunity from legislation or the benefit of section 21
48. [1904] 2 K.B. 164.
49. Bank Voor Handel en Scheepvaart N. V. v. Administrator of Hungarian Property [I954] A.e. 584.
50. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cameron (1865) II H.L.e. 443; Coomber v. BerkshireJusrices
(1893) 9 App.Cas 61.
51. [1950] I K.B. 18.
52. Territon'al Auxiliary Forces Association of the County of London v. Nichols [1949] 1 K.B. 35.
53. [1965] Ch. 62.
54. [1964] Ch. 614.
55. Nottingham Area No. J Hospital Management Committee v. Owen [1958] 1 Q.B. 50.
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of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which prevents the granting of injunctions "in
any proceedings against the Crown." In British Medical Association v. Greater
Glasgow Health Board56 the House of Lords held that the health board was not
entitled to immunity from interdict proceedings by virtue of that section because
such proceedings were not proceedings against the Crown. The relevant
legislation creating the predecessors of health boards had made them liable to be
sued in their own names. That legislation ante-dated the Crown Proceedings Act
1947 which was an Act intended to make it easier rather than more difficult to sue
the Crown. In the view of Lord Jauncey, who delivered the only speech, there was
nothing in section 21 to show that it was intended to take away existing rights.
Lord Jauncey found support also in section 17(3) which he thought showed that
Parliament had in mind government departments and not bodies such as those
running the National Health Service.
Against this background it is interesting to speculate whether in Lord Advocate
v. Dumbarton D.C .. 57 Tarmac Construction, the independent company which
carried out the work, could have relied on Crown immunity had the issue been
explicitly rajsed as, unfortunately, it was not before the House of Lords. No doubt
because the matter had by the time of the appeal become academic it was not
thought worthwhile to pursue a topic subsidiary to the main issue of the position of
the Crown. Some support for the view that Tarmac Construction could have
claimed Crown immunity is found in Campbell A.G. (Arcam) Ltd. v.
Worcestershire e.c..58 Land had been requisitioned by the War Office during the
Second World War. It was then occupied by Shell-Mex in order to provide petrol
supplies for the Army. In the Court of Appeal only Ungoed Thomas J considered
the question and he concluded that the company was acting as agent of the Crown
and hence entitled to the immunity from the Restriction of Ribbon Development
Act 1935 which, it was agreed, was possessed by the War Office. It might be
arguable that it is easier to establish a right to shelter behind the shield of Crown
immunity when carrying out work on land occupied by the Crown than on facts
such as in the Dumbarcon D.C. case.
The problem has arisen in two Australian cases. In Roberts v. Ahern59 the High
Court held that the Police Offences Act 1890, section 5 of which made it an offence
to empty cesspits or cart nightsoil without a licence, did not bind the Crown. It
then went on to hold that an employee of an independent contractor employed by
the Crown to remove nightsoil from Crown premises could not be prosecuted for
not having obtained the necessary licence. In Commonwealth of Australia v.
Bogle,60 however, Roberts v. Ahern was regarded as "an extreme application" of the
law to the facts. In Bogle the running of hostels for immigrants had been entrusted
56. [1989JA.C. 1211.
57. [1989J 3 W.L.R. 1346.
58. (1963) 61 L.G.R. 371.
59. (1904) I C.L.R. 406.
60. (1953) 89 c.L.R. 229.
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by the government to a company of which all the incorporators were civil servants.
The High Court held that the company could not rely on Crown immunity to
claim exemption from the Prices Regulation Act 1948-1951 (Vict.). It was "simply
a company formed in the ordinary way ... and functioning as such within the
legal system of the State."61 So far as can be acertained from the report of the
Dumbarton D. C. case the same is true of Tarmac Construction.
Where the Crown lets land to a tenant he would not normally be able to claim
Crown immunity: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food v. Jenkins. 62Even in
the absence of an express statutory provision as in that case, it is difficult to see how
a tenant could claim to be a Crown servant or in consimili casu to a Crown servant.
But if the Crown required work to be undertaken for it - as in the Campbell A. G.
(Arcam) Ltd. case - and granted a lease to the firm undertaking the work for it,
there seems no reason why the firm should not be entitled to Crown immunity.
Support for this view can be derived from Nouingham Area No. 1Hospital
Management Commiuee v. Owen63 where the Divisional Court, in determining the
scope of section 106 of the Public Health Act 1936 which referred to premises
"occupied for the public service of the Crown", distinguished the purpose of the
occupation from the status of the occupier. The question is occupation for Crown
service or not; the title of the occupier is irrelevant. An unusual claim to invoke the
immunity of the Crown from planning legislation was made in Spook Erection Ltd.
v. Secretary of State for the Environment. 64The appellant company, as the owner of
a market franchise originating in a grant of Charles I, claimed to be entitled, like
the Crown, to immunity from the Town and Country Planning Acts 1947 and
1971. The Court of Appeal held, however, that a franchise, once granted, is a
private right. The holder is not acting in any sense on behalf of the Crown.
3. The right of the Crown to take the benefit of a statute
Section 31(1) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 provides that nothing in that
Act shall "prejudice the right of the Crown to take advantage of the provisions of
an Act of Parliament although not named therein." The existence of this right is
attested to by Blackstone and Chitty.65 In Cayzer Irvine &Co. v. Board of Trade66
Scrutton LJ referred to the right but refrained from expressing any concluding
view, while making typically trenchant comments on the alleged authorities cited
in its support:
"a passage in an unsuccessful argument of a law officer which was not even
relevant to the case before the Court, but which has been taken out by a text
61. At p.259, per Fullager J.
62. [1963] 2 Q.B. 317; cf. Retaruke Timbers Co. Ltd. v. Rodney C.G. [1984J 2 N.Z.L.R. 129.
63. [1958] I Q.B. 50.
64. [1989J Q.B. 300.
65. Supra n.12; Hogg, supra n.IO, p.180 et seq.; Craies, supra n.12, p.438, et seq.
66. [1927J I K.B. 269, 294. See also Nisbet Shipping Co. Ltd. v. R. [1955J I W.L.R. 1031, 1035.
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writer and repeated for centuries until it was believed that it must have some
foundation67 ... and possibly a passage in 7 Rep.32a,68 which is not the
report of a case decided in the House of Lords, but the case of a private
conference between the law officers and the Chief Justices of the Stuart
Kings in a case in which the parties, the subjects affected by the decision
which was given against them, were not present and were not heard."
Sir Ivor Jennings commented that the case showed "upon what a slender basis of
precedent rest some of the most familiar of our text book maxims."69 Rather
disappointingly in Re Cushla 70where the Crown sought the benefit of section 31 of
the Bankruptcy Act 1914 Vinelott J was able to find for the Crown on the
construction of the section without having to resort to this rule.
4. Criticism of the present law
The presumption in favour of the immunity of the Crown as laid down in
modem cases is wider than anything claimed by the old authorities. To show, in
the absence of express words, th~t a statute binds by necessary implication it is
necessary, according to the Privy Council in the Province of Bombay case,71 to
demonstrate that otherwise the effect of the statute would be wholly frustrated. As
Parliament increasingly legislates "for the public good" in the sense of laying
down standards of public hygiene, conditions of employment, restrictions on
pollution, it is difficult to see why the application of these standards to hospitals or
prisons, for example, should depend on a rule of construction which itself depends
on whether a particular activity - running a hospital - is a Crown service or not.
The present position is clearly convenient for the executive. Legislation does not
normally affect it unless by express provision - for example the Equal Pay Act
1970, section 1(8). Were the rule of construction otherwise it would be necessary to
seek and justify express exemption from legislation. As it is, the freedom of the
executive is maintained until a particular case, such as Cooper v. Hawkins,72
exposes the absurdity of the Crown's immunity or political pressure finally secures
the extension, for example, to hospital kitchens, of the legislation which for years
has applied to commercial undertakings: National Health Service (Amendment)
Act 1986.
67. Scrutton LJ is referring to remarks of counsel in the Magdalen College Case (1615) II Co.Rep.66b.
68. The Case of a Fine Levied by rheKing Tenanr in Tail ere. (1605). This report considered whetherthe
King "in his natural capacity as an Englishman, not in his public and royal capacity", could take
advantage of De Donis to bar an entail. Coke thought he could: "it would be hard that the
King ... should be in a worse condition than if he had not been King."
69. (1927) 43 L.Q.R. 157.
70. [1979] 3 All E.R. 415.
71. [1947] A.C. 58.
72. [1904] 2 K.B. 164.The result of the case was the Motor Car Act 1903, s.16. The current provision,
subjecting Crown servants to road traffic legislation, is section 183, Road Traffic Act 1988.
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If the Executive has no reason to wish to reverse the present presumption it is at
least open to the courts to be more willing to find "the necessary implication" in
the absence of express words. A reluctance to do so in the case of criminal liability
is perhaps explicable and justifiable as the High Court of Australia suggested in
Cain v. Doyle.73 But in reality there is nothing absurd in the Crown being
prosecuted in its own courts in the twentieth century. Certainly no one would
dispute that criminal liability can be expressly imposed on the Crown in the form
of government departments or civil servants. In other areas, however, the courts
could well adopt a more liberal approach. So far the only class of case where they
have shown any willingness to construe statutes to the prejudice of the Crown is
where a statute imposes conditions or restrictions on the exercise of a prerogative
power: Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel;74 Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v.
The Queen.75Both cases illustrate that even the deference shown to the Crown may
give way to the respect of the common law for property rights.
The right of the Crown to claim the benefit of legislation not named in it has
been little invoked in modern times. Its apparent unfairness, under which the
Crown might invoke a statute in its favour while denying that it was bound by the
same statute, would disappear if the presumption of construction in favour of the
Crown were reversed. Until that time it will remain as one of the more curious
consequences of the privileged position the Crown still holds in the common law.
A Scots lawyer might wish to end with a rather different criticism. Granted that
the law on statutory interpretation should be the same in England and Scotland, as
Lord Keith convincingly argued, could not that law be Scots law. At least might
not its merits be examined before being abandoned. To some Lord Advocate v.
Dumbarton D. C. 76 might seem another example of the "pretentions of English law
as 'imperial law' ."77
73. (1946) 72 C.L.R. 409. On this ground the decision in Cooper v. Hawkins [1904] 2 K.B. 164 can be
defended.
74. [1920J A.C. 508; Hogg, supra n.lO, 171.
75. [1978J 88 D.L.R. (3d) 462.
76. [1989J 3 W.L.R. 1346.
77. Sir Thomas B. Smith. Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol. v, p.379.
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